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IT’S NOT TOO LATE: APPLYING CONTINUINGVIOLATION THEORY TO THE DESIGNATION OF
CRITICAL HABITAT UNDER THE ESA
Amelia Boone
Abstract: The Endangered Species Act (ESA or the Act) requires the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service (the Service) to designate critical habitat for every species it lists as
threatened or endangered. Generally, the Service must designate critical habitat within one
year of listing the species. If it cannot determine the species’ habitat at the moment of listing,
it can issue a finding of “not determinable,” which gives it one additional year to study the
species and its habitat needs. At the end of that additional year, the Service must list the
critical habitat, using whatever data is available. On close to 1500 occasions, the Service has
failed to designate critical habitat within one year of issuing a “not determinable” finding.
The Service’s duty to designate critical habitat is enforceable by private parties under the
ESA’s citizen-suit provision. Because the ESA does not contain a statute of limitations, these
citizen suits are subject to the general federal six-year statute of limitations. Courts have
disagreed on how the statute of limitations applies when citizens file claims to force the
Service to list critical habitat for a threatened or endangered species. The Eleventh Circuit
has held that the statute of limitations time-bars the suits, while three different district courts
have tolled the statute of limitations under different theories. This Comment argues that
courts should interpret the Service’s failure to designate critical habitat as a continuing
violation that perpetually tolls the statute of limitations until the Service performs its duty.
This approach is consistent with the statute’s plain text, and it advances the ESA’s single,
overriding policy purpose: to protect endangered and threatened species from extinction.

INTRODUCTION
In 1973, Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA) “to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved,” and “to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and
threatened species.”1 Congress ordered the Secretary of the Interior,2
through the Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service), to list threatened
and endangered species in the Federal Register “solely on the basis of
the best scientific and commercial data available.”3 The Service must—
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 2(b), 87 Stat. 884, 885 (1973)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000)). “Species” is defined as “any subspecies of
fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or
wildlife which interbreeds when mature.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
2. The Endangered Species Act is implemented by the Secretary of the Interior through the Fish
and Wildlife Service. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15). This Comment refers to the Fish and Wildlife
Service as the responsible party, thereby involving the Secretary of the Interior.
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).
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to “the maximum extent prudent and determinable”4—designate the
species’ critical habitat concurrently with listing a species. If the species’
habitat is not determinable, the Service has “not more than one
additional year” to study the situation.5 After that year, the Service must
designate the species’ critical habitat based on whatever data is available
at that time.6
The Service has designated critical habitat for 508 of the 1353
domestic species it lists as threatened or endangered.7 Environmental
watch groups have frequently filed citizen suits to force the Service to
list critical habitat for these species, sometimes more than six years after
the Service listed them as threatened or endangered.8 Because the ESA
contains no statute of limitations, the six-year federal statute of
limitations9 applies to these citizen suits. Courts grappling with how the
federal statute of limitations affects parties’ citizen-suit enforcement
powers have come to differing conclusions.10
This Comment argues that courts should toll the statute of limitations
for citizen suits brought to compel the Service to designate the critical
habitat of endangered and threatened species. Part I describes the history
and purpose of the ESA and the process for designating critical habitat.
Part II explains the general federal statute of limitations and its policy
justifications. Part III introduces the continuing-violation theory and the
similar series-of-discrete-violations theory. Part IV examines the
conflicting approaches courts have taken when plaintiffs have filed suit
more than six years after the Service first breached its mandatory duty to

4. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
5. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii).
6. Id.
7. Letter from Michele Zwartjes, Fish and Wildlife Biologist, Endangered Species Listing
Division,
to
author
(July
14,
2008),
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev403n7.pdf. Courts recognize that scarce
resources have substantially contributed to this failure to designate critical habitat. See, e.g.,
Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 809 (W.D. La. 2007) (“Stated crassly and starkly, it
is money—more accurately, the lack of money—that has precipitated this suit . . . . Unfortunately
for all concerned, Congress has declined to curtail the scope of the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
duties under the Endangered Species Act, yet has refused to adequately fund the Service to enable it
to carry out those duties.”).
8. See infra Part IV.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2000).
10. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006) (characterizing
the failure to designate critical habitat as a one-time violation); Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Serv., No. 3:07CV00358, 2007 WL 4117978 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007) (characterizing the
failure as a series of discrete violations); Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. at 820–21 (characterizing the
failure as a continuing violation).
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designate critical habitat for listed species. Finally, Part V argues that
courts should interpret the Service’s failure to designate critical habitat
as a continuing violation that tolls the statute of limitations until the
violation is cured.
I.

CONGRESS PASSED THE ESA TO PROTECT THREATENED
AND ENDANGERED SPECIES AND THEIR HABITATS

Enacted in 1973, the ESA provides a comprehensive array of
protections for endangered and threatened species and their habitats.11 Its
overriding purpose is species conservation.12 To accomplish this goal,
Congress ordered the Service to designate critical habitat concurrently
with listing a species as threatened or endangered.13 Congress also
included a citizen-suit provision, which empowers private parties to
enforce many of the Service’s mandatory duties.14
A.

Congress Passed the ESA to Protect Threatened and Endangered
Species from Extinction

In 1973, the rate of extinction in the United States was approximately
one species per year, and half of all recorded extinctions taking place in
the previous two thousand years had occurred since 1923.15 In the face
of this accelerating extinction rate, Congress passed the ESA to protect
endangered and threatened species and the habitats upon which they
depend.16 Congress was primarily concerned with conserving habitat in
order to protect species viability.17

11. See Josh Thompson, Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Designation, Redesignation, and Regulatory Duplication, 58 ALA. L. REV. 885, 885–86 (2007); Thomas Darin,
Designating Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection Versus Agency
Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 209, 210–13 (2000).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved,
[and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened
species . . . .”).
13. See id. § 1533.
14. See id. § 1540(g).
15. 119 CONG. REC. 30,165 (1973) (statement of Rep. Grover).
16. See id.
17. See Darin, supra note 11, at 212–13; H.R. REP. NO. 95-1625, at 5 (1978) (“The loss of habitat
for many species is universally cited as the major cause for the extinction of species worldwide.”).
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The ESA Requires the Fish and Wildlife Service to Protect Critical
Habitat for Threatened and Endangered Species

The ESA requires the Service to identify endangered and threatened
species and issue regulations necessary to protect them.18 As part of this
duty, the Service must designate critical habitat for a species
concurrently with listing it as threatened or endangered.19 A species’
critical habitat is defined as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by
the species, at the time it is listed in accordance with the
provisions of section 1533 of this title, on which are found those
physical or biological features (I) essential to the conservation of
the species and (II) which may require special management
considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the
species at the time it is listed in accordance with the provisions
of section 1533 of this title, upon a determination by the
Secretary that such areas are essential for the conservation of the
species.20
The ESA requires a two-way exchange between the Service and federal
agencies with regard to critical habitat. First, the Service must consult
with federal agencies to ensure that the agencies’ actions do not result in
the “destruction or adverse modification” of critical habitat.21 Second, an
agency must consult with the Service any time the agency seeks
permitting or licensing changes that could potentially encroach on
critical habitat.22
The Service also has ongoing obligations to endangered and
threatened species themselves, beyond protecting their habitats. The
Service must coordinate with agencies to ensure that their actions are
“not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species . . . .”23 The Service must also conduct a
review of every threatened or endangered species at least once every five
years to determine whether it should change the species’ status from

18. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a), (d) (2000).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 1532(5)(A).
21. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
22. See id. § 1536(a)(2), (3).
23. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
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threatened to endangered, or vice versa, or remove it from the list of
endangered and threatened species altogether.24
There are two exceptions to the Service’s duty to designate habitat
concurrently with listing a species as threatened or endangered. First, the
Service need not designate critical habitat if doing so would be “not
prudent.”25 Designation is not prudent if “[t]he species is threatened by
taking or other human activity, and identification of critical habitat can
be expected to increase the degree of such threat to the species,” or if
“critical habitat would not be beneficial to the species.”26 Second, the
Service may delay the designation for one additional year if it
determines that the critical habitat of such species is “not then
determinable.”27 A “not determinable” finding means there is not enough
information to analyze the impacts of habitat designation, or that the
biological needs of the species are not well known.28 If the Service
issues such a finding, it has one more year to research the species and its
environment.29 The Service must publish a final regulation at the end of
that year, based on the data available at that time.30
C.

The ESA’s Citizen-Suit Provision Empowers Citizens to Compel
the Service to Perform Non-Discretionary Duties

The ESA includes a citizen-suit provision31 that gives standing to any
person32 who seeks injunctive relief for violations or potential violations
of the ESA.33 The provision allows private citizens to file a claim in
federal court to force the Service “to perform any act or duty under
24. Id. § 1533(c)(2).
25. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A).
26. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1) (2006). The construction of the “not prudent” exception to the
Secretary’s duty to designate critical habitat are beyond the scope of this Comment.
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(A), (C)(ii).
28. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(2).
29. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii).
30. Id.
31. Id. § 1540(g).
32. A “person” is defined in 16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) as “an individual, corporation, partnership,
trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department or
instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a
State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State; or
any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1). Though Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), later
limited standing, the Supreme Court has noted that the Lujan requirements do not present a major
obstacle for citizen suits. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 163–64 (1997) (commenting on the
“remarkable breadth” of the ESA’s citizen-suit provision in granting standing to interested parties).
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section 1533 of this title which is not discretionary with [the Service].”34
The Service’s duty to list critical habitat for endangered and threatened
species falls under § 1533,35 and the citizen-suit provision, § 1540(g), is
the sole legal mechanism for enforcing this duty.36 The ESA does not
include its own statute of limitations, which means citizen suits are
subject to the general six-year time-bar on suits against the United States
government.37
II.

THE FEDERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PREVENTS
PARTIES FROM BRINGING STALE CLAIMS AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT

A six-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401, applies to civil
actions against the federal government,38 unless otherwise specified
within a particular piece of legislation. This statute protects the
government from the typical problems associated with stale claims: lost
evidence, faded memories, and witnesses that disappeared long ago.39
Additionally, § 2401 limits the scope of the federal government’s waiver
of sovereign immunity.40

34. See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C).
35. See id. § 1533(b)(6)(C).
36. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 161–75; S. Appalachian Biodiversity Proj. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 181 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) (explaining that if the Secretary does not
designate critical habitat within the time allowed and a citizen suit cannot go forward, “then no one
may compel the Service to do so.”). Plaintiffs have tried to bring suit under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000), but courts have held that § 1540(g) precludes suits
under the APA. See, e.g., Haw. County Green Party v. Clinton, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1193 (D.
Haw. 2000) (“[I]f there is a remedy under the ESA, then action under the APA is not allowable.”);
Am. Canoe Ass’n Inc., v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 927 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(“[T]he APA does not provide an avenue for duplicative review when a statute specifically sets out
procedures for a review of agency action . . . .”).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2000).
38. Id. § 2401.
39. See Note, Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1185–
86 (1950).
40. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983) (noting that the doctrine of strict
construal means that waiver of immunity must not be “enlarged beyond what the language
requires.”); Spannaus v. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“[U]nlike an ordinary
statute of limitations, § 2401(a) is a jurisdictional condition attached to the government’s waiver of
sovereign immunity, and as such must be strictly construed.”).
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A.

Statutes of Limitations Protect Defendants from Stale Claims

Statutes of limitations “are found and approved in all systems of
enlightened jurisprudence.”41 They have been part of the American
system of law since the beginning of the Republic. In Adams v. Woods,42
for example, the Supreme Court said that it “would be utterly repugnant
to the genius of our laws” if cases could be “brought at any distance of
time.”43
Generally, three main rationales for statutes of limitations have been
recognized: disposing of stale claims, protecting defendants from
fraudulent claims, and providing repose to defendants.44 First, statutes of
limitations protect defendants from claims that would be difficult to
defend because of the passage of time.45 They promote justice by
preventing unfair surprise caused by claims that have been allowed to lie
dormant until memories fade and evidence is lost.46 Second, they
promote social stability by protecting a long-existing status quo, and
represent a legislative judgment that it is unjust for defendants to be sued
over stale claims.47 Finally, statutes of limitations address the suspicion
that stale claims simply lack merit to begin with.48 The Supreme Court
has recognized that statutes of limitations sometimes create inequitable
results, but the benefits of certainty and repose outweigh the costs:
“Statutes of limitation find their justification in necessity and
convenience rather than in logic. They represent expedients, rather than
principles . . . . They are by definition arbitrary, and their operation does
not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim, or the voidable
and unavoidable delay.”49
41. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S.
135, 139 (1879)).
42. 6 U.S. 336 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.).
43. Id. at 342.
44. See James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine As
Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
589, 591–92 (1996); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2170
(2007) (“Statutes of limitations serve a policy of repose.”) (citing Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah,
414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974)).
45. Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965).
46. Id.
47. See Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2170.
48. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1868) (“[Statutes of limitations] are
founded upon the general experience of mankind that claims, which are valid, are not usually
allowed to remain neglected. The lapse of years without any attempt to enforce a demand creates,
therefore, a presumption against its original validity . . . . ”).
49. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
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The Statute of Limitations for Claims Against the United States
Represents a Waiver of the Government’s Sovereign Immunity

The general federal statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2401, provides
that “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be
barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of
action first accrues.”50 The moment of accrual is determined by
reference to the substantive law.51 When the last element of any cause of
action occurs, the statute of limitations begins to run.52
The § 2401 statute of limitations, a waiver of the federal
government’s sovereign immunity, is typically strictly construed.
Sovereign immunity means “the United States may not be sued without
its consent.”53 A lack of governmental consent is a fundamental defect
that deprives the court of jurisdiction.54 This principle of sovereign
immunity has its roots in English law. It is based on the belief that the
King, the ultimate source of all authority by divine right, could do no
wrong.55 While the Constitution does not guarantee the federal
government sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has referred to it
since the early years of the Republic.56
Jurisdictional statutes of limitations, such as the six-year statute of
limitations for actions brought against the government,57 operate as a
waiver of sovereign immunity.58 As such, courts have generally limited
50. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2000). If the plaintiff is under legal disability or in a foreign jurisdiction
at the time a claim accrues, the action may be commenced within three years after the disability
ceases. Id.
51. Note, Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1200
(1950).
52. See id.
53. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
54. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“[T]he United States, as sovereign, is
immune from suit save as it consents to be sued, and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court
define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”) (internal citations omitted).
55. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES, *238, *246. Many of America’s most prominent
and influential political thinkers argued that the new republican government should enjoy the same
immunity. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 567 (Alexander Hamilton) (Charles Scribner’s Sons
ed., 1897) (“It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent.”).
56. See, e.g, Cohens v. State of Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 303 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating, in
dictum, “[i]t is an axiom in politics, that a sovereign and independent State is not liable to the suit of
any individual, nor amenable to any judicial power, without its own consent.”); United States v.
Clarke, 33 U.S. 436, 444 (1834) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating, in dictum, “the United States are not
suable of common right . . . . ”).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (2000).
58. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 895 F.2d 588, 592 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The
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the scope of the government’s waiver by strictly construing the statute of
limitations.59 This doctrine of strict construal means that waiver of
immunity must not be “enlarged beyond what the language requires.”60
The Supreme Court has stated that courts will not infer a waiver from
legislative history or congressional policy purposes. Rather, the waiver
must be explicit in the statutory text.61 If the statute expressly waives the
government’s immunity, “[a court’s] task is to discern the unequivocally
expressed intent of Congress, construing ambiguities in favor of
immunity.”62 The § 2401 statute of limitations limits the scope of a
waiver of sovereign immunity. Therefore, courts interpret the statute of
limitations narrowly.63
III. IF A VIOLATION IS CONTINUOUS OR RECURRING,
COURTS HAVE TOLLED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Courts have applied the continuing-violation theory and the series-ofdiscrete-violations theory to toll statutes of limitations. Under the
continuing-violation theory, courts toll the statute of limitations for civil
wrongs that occur within the statutory time period, even if they began
before the statutory time period.64 Similarly, under the series-of-discrete
violations theory, the court tolls the statute of limitations when the
defendant repeats the same misbehavior so frequently that it makes more
sense to aggregate the separate incidents and treat them as a single
incident, even if some occurred outside the time limit of the statute of

doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes suit against the United States without the consent of
Congress; the terms of its consent define the extent of the court’s jurisdiction. The applicable statute
of limitations is a term of consent. [A] plaintiff’s failure to sue within the period of limitations is not
simply a waivable defense; it deprives the court of the jurisdiction to entertain the action.”) (internal
citations omitted).
59. See Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957) (“[T]his Court has long decided that
limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly
observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied.”); Spannaus v. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52,
55 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that because § 2401 is a jurisdictional statute, it must be strictly
construed).
60. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983) (internal ellipsis omitted).
61. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
62. United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 531 (1995) (internal quotation omitted).
63. See Spannaus, 824 F.2d at 55 (“[U]nlike an ordinary statute of limitations, § 2401(a) is a
jurisdictional condition attached to the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity, and as such
must be strictly construed.”).
64. See Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 271, 273–74
(2008).
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limitations.65 The similarity of, and overlap between, these two doctrines
has confused courts for years, leading them to adopt different and
conflicting tests in determining when, if, and how to toll the statute of
limitations.66
A.

Courts Sometimes Use the Continuing-Violation Theory to Toll the
Statute of Limitations When a Wrongdoer Fails to Cure Ongoing
Misbehavior

When defendants begin their misconduct outside of the statutory
filing period, but persist in the same violation until a time that falls
within the filing period, courts sometimes apply the continuing-violation
doctrine.67 Courts have applied this doctrine in many different contexts,
including civil rights, trespass, nuisance, employment discrimination,
antitrust and environmental claims.68
The Supreme Court applied the continuing-violation doctrine in the
civil-rights context in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.69
Abner Morgan, a black man, started working for Amtrak in August
1990.70 He endured a series of racially demeaning incidents, including
being assigned menial tasks unrelated to his job as an electrician.71 His
supervisor made a final racist comment in March 1995, and Morgan was
fired soon after.72 Morgan filed a claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,73 seeking relief for Amtrak’s discriminatory acts and the
hostile work environment he endured.74 Under Title VII, an aggrieved
party must file a claim “within three hundred days after the alleged
unlawful employment practice occurred.”75
65. Id. at 272–74.
66. Id. at 273.
67. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115–19 (2002); Held v. Gulf Oil,
684 F.2d 427, 430–31 (6th Cir. 1982) (characterizing constant sex discrimination as a continuing
violation); Acme Print Ink, Co. v. Menard, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1498 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (holding that
continuous leaking of a hazardous substance from a former landfill in violation of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act was a continuing violation).
68. See Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 271, 273–74
(2008).
69. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
70. Id. at 115–19.
71. Id. at 106 n.1.
72. Id. at 115 n.8.
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000h (2000).
74. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 105–06.
75. Id. at 122–23. The statute contains two statutes of limitations: 180 days and 300 days. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). It provides that such a claim must be filed (1) within 180 days after the
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The Supreme Court held that Morgan could recover only for the
discrete incidents of discrimination that had occurred at some point
during the previous three hundred days.76 But the Court further held that
he could recover for the entire five years of hostile work environment he
had suffered.77 The Court based its decision on the different natures of
the respective “unlawful employment practice[s],” and when each one
had “occurred.”78 The Court characterized each separate incident of
discrimination as a discrete, actionable event that started its own statute
of limitations,79 and found that “Morgan can only file a charge to cover
discrete acts that ‘occurred’ within the appropriate time period.”80 The
nature of a hostile-workplace offense is very different, the Court said,
because it does not occur on any particular day. It sometimes occurs
over a series of years.81 Though the claim is composed of a series of
separate acts, collectively it constitutes “one unlawful employment
practice.”82 Because Morgan had filed suit within three hundred days of
the last time a hostile work environment had “occurred,” the statute of
limitations did not time-bar his claim.83 In fact, the Supreme Court
directed the trial court to consider the entire five-year violation when
calculating liability.84

alleged unlawful employment practice occurred; or (2) within 300 days after such occurrence, if the
person aggrieved initially instituted discrimination proceedings with a state or local agency.
76. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110–15.
77. Id. at 115–19.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
79. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110.
80. Id. at 114.
81. Id. at 115 (“[T]he ‘unlawful employment practice’ therefore cannot be said to occur on any
particular day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete acts,
a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.”).
82. Id. at 117 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)).
83. Id.
84. Id. (“The timely filing provision only requires that a Title VII plaintiff file a charge within a
certain number of days after the unlawful practice happened. It does not matter, for purposes of the
statute, that some of the component acts of the hostile work environment fall outside the statutory
time period. Provided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire
time period of the hostile environment may be used by a court for the purposes of determining
liability.”).
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Courts Have Applied the Series-of-Discrete-Violations Theory to
Toll the Statute of Limitations When a Wrongdoer Repeatedly
Offends

Courts sometimes apply the series-of-discrete-violations theory when
a wrongdoer persists in repeating violations of an identical nature.85 The
clock starts anew with each discrete violation.86 When adopting this
approach, courts are careful to ensure that the plaintiff is suffering from
a new incident of wrongdoing, and not from present consequences that
flow from a one-time, past violation.87 The Eleventh Circuit utilized this
“series of discrete violations” theory in Knight v. Columbus.88
Firefighters from Columbus, Georgia filed suit against their city in 1992,
alleging Columbus had violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)89
by refusing to pay overtime.90 The FLSA barred any claim unless it was
“commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued.”91 The
City had adopted the classification system at issue in 1985, well outside
the statutory filing period.92 The district court granted the City’s motion
for summary judgment, finding that the statute of limitations time-barred
the firefighters’ claims.93
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, allowing the
firefighters’ claim to proceed. The court held that each paycheck without
overtime “constitute[d] a new violation of the FLSA.”94 The court took
great care to distinguish the firefighters’ theory from the type of
continuing violation at issue in Morgan:95 “The term ‘continuing
violation’ suggests that the original violation, namely the decision to
classify overtime-eligible employees as exempt, is somehow the source
of the employees’ present ability to recover. It is not.”96 The court was
85. See, e.g., Knight v. Columbus, 19 F.3d 579, 582 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that each paycheck
constituted a new violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Gibbons v. Auburn Univ., 108 F.
Supp.2d 1311, 1317 (M.D. Ala. 2000) (holding that each instance in which an employee receives an
unequal paycheck based on race constitutes a repeated, discrete violation).
86. See Knight, 19 F.3d at 582.
87. See Calloway v. Partners Nat’l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 448 (11th Cir. 1993).
88. 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 1994).
89. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2000).
90. Knight, 19 F.3d at 580.
91. Id. at 581 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1985)).
92. Id. at 580.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 581.
95. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
96. Knight, 19 F.3d at 582.
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not concerned with when, exactly, the City had misclassified the
employees—the only relevant fact was that the firefighters had received
defective paychecks at some point during the statute-of-limitations
window.97 Instead of a continuous failure to pay, the court recognized
that this case involved a “series of repeated violations of an identical
nature,” each one giving “rise to a new cause of action.”98 Because of the
court’s decision to characterize the firefighters’ claim as a series of
discrete violations, each of which started its own filing period, the
firefighters were able to recover only for paychecks they had received
during the previous two years.99
C.

Courts Have Applied the Continuing-Violation Doctrine in a
Different Environmental Context

Courts have applied the continuing-violation doctrine to violations of
the Clean Water Act (CWA).100 In Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Fox,101 the District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the statute of limitations did not apply to a claim in which the
plaintiff alleged that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed
to issue certain water-quality regulations.102 As early as 1979, the State
of New York was obligated to propose Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs) for various polluted waters to the EPA.103 New York never
submitted a proposal, and courts treat such an omission as a constructive
submission of zero TMDLs.104 The EPA failed to review that
constructive submission and failed to issue the appropriate
regulations.105

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000) (enacted in 1972 as amendments to the Water Quality Act
of 1965). See, e.g., Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1010 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that failure to obtain permit was a continuing violation of the CWA); American Canoe
Ass’n v. United States EPA, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 925 (D. Va. 1998) (concluding that a government
agency’s failure to perform a nondiscretionary action “is better understood as a continuing violation,
which plaintiffs may challenge at any time provided the delay continues,” and characterizing the
“application of a statute of limitations to a claim of unreasonable delay [as] grossly inappropriate.”).
101. 909 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
102. Id. at 159–60.
103. Id. at 156–57.
104. Id. at 157.
105. Id.
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The plaintiff, an environmental non-profit organization, brought a
CWA citizen suit106 in 1995 for a failure that first occurred in 1979.107
The court refused to apply the general federal statute of limitations.108
The court grounded its decision first in public policy, pointing out that
the citizen suit was the only mechanism for forcing the EPA to act:
“[T]he recourse for enforcing the mandatory duty established by
Congress is the citizen suit . . . . The practical effect of imposing a
statute of limitations in a suit such as this is to repeal the mandatory
duties established by Congress . . . . ”109 The court held, in the
alternative, that the violation was a continuing one: “[T]he continued
failure of a state to establish TMDLs creates a continuing duty of the
Administrator to disapprove of the state’s actions and to promulgate
TMDLs.”110
IV. COURTS HAVE APPLIED THE FEDERAL STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS INCONSISTENTLY TO ESA CITIZEN SUITS
Courts have split on how the Service’s failure to designate critical
habitat for endangered and threatened species within one year of issuing
a “not determinable” finding interacts with the six-year statute of
limitations under § 2401. The Eleventh Circuit held that the failure is a
one-time violation that time-barred a suit brought twelve years after the
Service first listed two species of minnows as endangered.111 Federal
district courts in Tennessee and Louisiana called the Service’s failure a
continuing violation, and tolled the statute’s time period.112 The District
Court of Oregon reached substantially the same result as the Tennessee
and Louisiana district courts, but characterized the Service’s failure as a
series of discrete violations.113

106. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (“Any person may commence a civil action on his own
behalf . . . against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform
any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.”).
107. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Fox, 909 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
108. Id. at 159–60 (refusing to apply 28 U.S.C. § 2401 or any other statute of limitations to the
claim).
109. Id. at 159.
110. Id. at 160.
111. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006).
112. Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 820–21 (W.D. La. 2007); S. Appalachian
Biodiversity Proj. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 181 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (E.D. Tenn. 2001).
113. Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 3:07CV00358, 2007 WL 4117978,
at *5–6 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007).
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A.

The Eleventh Circuit Treated the Secretary’s Failure to Designate
Critical Habitat As a One-Time Violation Time-Barred by the
Statute of Limitations

In 2004, the Center for Biological Diversity brought a citizen suit,
Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton,114 to compel the Service to
designate critical habitat for two species of minnow, the Blue Shiner and
the Goldline Darter. In 1992, when the Service listed the two species as
endangered, it concluded that their critical habitat was not
determinable.115 The Service did not designate habitat during the next
twelve years, and conceded its failure to do so before the court.116 The
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia held that the Service’s
failure to designate critical habitat occurred one year after it listed the
fish as endangered in 1992, and that the violation ended that same
day.117 Because the Center did not bring suit within the next six years,
the federal statute of limitations barred its claim.118
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.119 The court
focused on two different clauses of 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii),120 the
subsection that requires the Service to list critical habitat “not later than”
the close of one year after issuing a “not determinable” finding.121 First,
the court reasoned that the language “not later than” creates a fixed point
in time at which the Service’s violation arises.122 That moment starts the
clock running on the statute of limitations. Second, the court found
additional textual support in the ESA’s requirement that the Service rely
on “such data as may be available at the time [sic]”123 when it ultimately

114. 385 F. Supp. 2d 1330 (N.D. Ga. 2005), aff’d, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006).
115. Id. at 1335.
116. Id. at 1332.
117. Id. at 1336 (“Because the ESA . . . imposed no continuing duty on Defendants regarding
[critical-habitat] designation, there is no continuing violation.”).
118. Id. at 1336–37.
119. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (“[If the] critical habitat of such species is not then
determinable, . . . the Secretary . . . may extend the one-year period . . . by not more than one
additional year, but not later than the close of such additional year the Secretary must publish a
final regulation, based on such data as may be available at that time, designating, to the maximum
extent prudent, such habitat.” (emphases added)).
121. Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1335. The court misquoted the statute during its textual analysis; the statute actually
reads, “at that time.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (emphasis added). The change does not seem to
have affected the court’s analysis.

417

Washington Law Review

Vol. 83:403, 2008

designates habitat. The Service’s one-year period for studying the
minnows’ habitats expired in 1993, and the plaintiffs filed suit in 2006.
The court argued that the ESA would require the Service to use only
data from 1993 to designate the fishes’ habitats in 2006: “If the duty
were ongoing, it would be anomalous for Congress to require the
Secretary to ignore new information when promulgating the rule.”124
The court also grounded its decision in the justifications for the
continuing-violation doctrine and principles of sovereign immunity.
Noting that the Eleventh Circuit applies the continuing-violation
doctrine only to situations “in which a reasonably prudent plaintiff
would have been unable to determine that a violation had occurred,”125
the court concluded that a reasonably prudent plaintiff in the Center’s
position situation would have known about the Service’s failure to
designate critical habitat for the minnows the day following the
deadline.126 Finally, the court interpreted the § 2401 statute of limitations
narrowly, explaining, “[t]he terms upon which the Government consents
to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be
implied.”127
B.

Several District Courts Have Tolled the Statute of Limitations in
Cases with Facts Similar to Those in Hamilton

Three federal district courts have held that the statute of limitations
does not bar citizen suits that seek to force the Service to list critical
habitat for threatened and endangered species. Two courts treated the
Service’s failure as a single, continuous violation.128 Another court held
that each day the Secretary failed to designate critical habitat was a
discrete violation.129 In all three cases, the courts tolled the statute of
limitations and ordered the Service to designate habitat for threatened
and endangered species.
Four years before the Eleventh Circuit decided Hamilton, a magistrate
judge for the Eastern District of Tennessee faced a similar set of relevant

124. Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (quoting Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 (1957)) (internal markings omitted).
128. Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 820–21 (W.D. La. 2007); S. Appalachian
Biodiversity Proj. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 181 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (E.D. Tenn. 2001).
129. Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 3:07CV00358, 2007 WL 4117978,
at *5–6 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007).
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facts and reached the opposite conclusion.130 In 2001, the Southern
Appalachian Biodiversity Project filed suit, asking that the court enjoin
the Service to designate critical habitat for nine species of mollusks. The
Service listed the different species as either threatened or endangered in
1993, and issued a “not determinable” habitat finding for each.131
The Biodiversity Project argued that the statute of limitations had not
started to run because the Service had never acted—that its “continuing
nonfeasance” was like a “continuing tort or continuing nuisance.”132 The
Service argued that the statute of limitations had started to run one year
and one day after it listed the mollusks as threatened or endangered
species.133 The Service argued that it would not be proper to interpret
that discrete event as a “continuing violation that would hold the statute
of limitations in abeyance for time in memorial . . . despite no indication
from Congress that it wished this to be the case.”134 The court disagreed
with the assertion that Congress had wanted the statute of limitations to
expire: “Respectfully, the non-repeal of 16 U.S.C. § 1533(B)(6)(C),
which unequivocally directs the Service to designate critical habitat
within one year of listing a species as endangered, must be presumed to
be an indication of Congress’s wishes.”135
130. S. Appalachian, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 883. The District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia took note of Southern Appalachian while deciding Hamilton, and erroneously distinguished
its facts. See Hamilton, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1335 (“[I]n the Tennessee action, [the Service] had not
designated a critical habitat because it was not ‘prudent’ to do so. In this case, critical habitat was
not designated because such habitat was not ‘determinable’ at the time.”). The Center for Biological
Diversity pointed out the error and moved for reconsideration pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). See
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration at 4–8, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 385 F.
Supp.
2d
1330
(N.D.
Ga.
2005)
(No.
1:04CV02573),
available
at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev403n130.pdf. The court did not acknowledge
the error in its order denying reconsideration. See Hamilton, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 1337–39.
131. S. Appalachian, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 884–85. The Secretary had issued a not-prudent finding
for seven other species of mollusks. The Service admitted it had not used the right criteria in
reaching the not-prudent finding, and asked the court for a “voluntary remand” to correct the error.
Id. The court gave the Service several different deadlines, between eighteen and twenty-four months
away, to propose a prudency rule to the Federal Register for each of the seven species. The court
was not happy with the outcome: “The Court frankly states that it feels that it has been forced to be
an unwilling accessory to a violation of the law, but the circumstances leave no alternative.” Id. at
888. As noted previously, supra note 26, the consequences of a not-prudent finding are beyond the
scope of this Comment.
132. S. Appalachian, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 887 (emphasis in original).
133. Id.
134. Supplemental Letter Brief at 2, S. Appalachian Biodiversity Proj. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 181 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) (No. 2:00CV00361), available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev403n134.pdf.
135. Id. Congressional non-action might indicate a contrary intent. The court noted, “In all
fairness, it also could be argued that the failure of Congress to provide sufficient funding to the
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The court rejected the Service’s argument that the violation was a
discrete event, but did not explain precisely how it understood the statute
of limitations to operate. The court characterized the Service’s inaction
as a continuing violation, but did not explain precisely how the
continuing-violation doctrine functions: “The statute of limitations
commences to run anew each and every day that the Service does not
fulfill the affirmative duty required of it. In short, the statute of
limitations has never commenced to run.”136
In Schoeffler v. Kempthorne,137 a group of plaintiffs asked the District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana to order the Service to
designate critical habitat for the Louisiana black bear. The bear’s historic
habitat included eastern Texas, southern Mississippi, southern Arkansas,
and all of Louisiana.138 The bear’s population had significantly declined
by the early 1900s because of market hunting and habitat loss.139
Schoeffler and the other plaintiffs had petitioned the Service to list the
black bear as threatened in 1987.140 The Service issued some ambiguous
findings141 and took a few half-steps toward a conclusion,142 but it did
not list the black bear as threatened until 1992, three weeks after an
advocacy group filed a citizen suit to force it to do just that.143 The
Service issued a “not determinable” finding for the black bear’s habitat
the same day it listed the animal as threatened.144 Over the next twelve

Service is a manifestation of an intent that the Endangered Species Act should be allowed to
languish.” Id. at 887 n.13.
136. Id. at 887.
137. 493 F. Supp. 2d 805 (W.D. La. 2007).
138. Daniel Miller et al., Genetic Variation in Black Bear Populations From Louisiana and
Arkansas: Examining the Potential Influence of Reintroductions From Minnesota, 10 URSUS 335,
335 (1998).
139. Id.
140. Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 810–11.
141. See Notice of Findings on Petitions to List the Louisiana Black Bear, Lower Keys Marsh
Rabbit, and Sherman’s Fox Squirrel, 53 Fed. Reg. 31,723 (Aug. 19, 1988) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17) (announcing that listing the black bear as threatened is “warranted but precluded by
other actions to amend the lists”).
142. See Proposed Threatened Status for the Louisiana Black Bear, Proposed Designation of
Threatened by Similarity of Appearance of all Bears of the Species Ursus americanus Within the
Historic Range of U. a. luteolus, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,341 (proposed June 21, 1990) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17).
143. Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 1992 WL 124796 (E.D. La. 1992) (No. 2:91CV04641)
(minute entry).
144. Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 810.
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years, the Service took a few tentative steps145 toward listing the bear’s
critical habitat, but never issued a regulation.146
In 2005, Schoeffler and others filed a claim against the Service,
asking the court to force the Service to list critical habitat for the
Louisiana black bear.147 The Service moved for summary judgment,
arguing that the statute of limitations had run. The court held that the
plaintiffs were never on notice that their right of action had accrued,
because the Service had never done anything that would have given
them actual or constructive notice that they had a right of action.148 The
plaintiffs had negotiated with the Service for years, hoping to reach a
resolution on the animal’s critical habitat. Under those circumstances,
said the court, there was nothing to suggest that the Service’s ongoing
failure to list habitat “should be perceived as adverse action, rather than
bureaucratic bungling or foot dragging.”149
In the alternative, the court held that the continuing-violation doctrine
had tolled the statute of limitations.150 The court defined the continuingviolation doctrine as embracing two types of cases.151 First, it described
a situation similar to the one in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan,152 where “the original violation occurred outside the statute of
limitations, but is closely related to other violations that are not timebarred. In such cases, recovery may be had for all violations, on the
theory that they are part of one, continuing violation.”153 The court then
described a situation like the one in Knight v. Columbus,154 where “an
initial violation, outside the statute of limitations, is repeated later.”155 In
145. See Proposed Designation of Critical Habitat for the Louisiana Black Bear, 58 Fed. Reg.
63,560 (proposed Dec. 2, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (proposing to determine the
Louisiana black bear’s critical habitat and opening a ninety-day period for public comment);
Reopening of Comment Period and Public Hearing on Proposed Designation of Critical Habitat for
the Louisiana Black Bear, 59 Fed. Reg. 10,607 (proposed March 7, 1994) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 17) (outlining proposed areas and reopening the period for public comment).
146. Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 816.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 817 (“The Court will . . . address plaintiffs’ alternative assertion [that the Service’s
failure was a continuing violation], finding, therefore holding that had defendant prevailed on the
issue of the accrual of the statute of limitations, this Court would continue to retain jurisdiction to
resolve the issues between the parties to this litigation.”).
151. Id. at 819.
152. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
153. Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
154. 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 1994).
155. Schoeffler, 493 F. Supp. 2d at 819.
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such situations, the court said, “each violation begins the limitations
period anew, and recovery may be had for at least those violations that
occurred within the period of limitations.”156 The court described the
Service’s failure to comply with its mandatory duty as falling within the
former category.157
In a 2007 case, Institute for Wildlife Protection v. Fish & Wildlife
Service,158 the District Court for the District of Oregon tolled the statute
of limitations under similar facts.159 The Institute for Wildlife Protection
asked the court to enjoin the Service to designate critical habitat for the
Oregon chub, a small fish endemic to the state.160 In 1993, chub
populations occupied only two percent of the fish’s historic range.161
Chemical spills, dam construction, and non-native species of fish all
threatened the remaining populations.162 The Service listed the species as
endangered in 1993.163 Thirteen and one-half years later, when the
Institute of Wildlife Protection filed suit, the Oregon chub was still
without designated critical habitat.164
The case originally came before a magistrate judge who
recommended that the court dismiss the claim as time-barred, relying on
the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Hamilton.165 The court did not adopt
the recommendation, instead applying the series-of-discrete-violations
doctrine and holding that each day the Service failed to list critical
habitat for the chub was a single, discrete violation.166 The court based

156. Id.
157. Id. at 820 (“[T]he Secretary’s duty under the law continues until the final regulation is
published. Even if plaintiffs’ right of action accrued when the deadline passed on January 7, 1993,
and the statute of limitations expired six years [sic], the Secretary’s violation is ongoing and does
not constitute a discrete one-time violation with lingering effects or consequences.”).
158. Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 3:07CV00358, 2007 WL 4117978
(D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007).
159. Id. at *6.
160. See Determination of Endangered Status for the Oregon Chub, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,800, 53,800–
01 (Oct. 18, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 3:07CV00358, 2007 WL
4117978, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007).
165. Id. at *4. Though the magistrate judge ultimately followed the decision in Hamilton, he
acknowledged the weight of the case law suggesting the violation was continuing. See Inst. for
Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 3:07CV00358, 2007 WL 4118136 (D. Or. 2007).
166. Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, at *6. Like the Schoeffler court, the Oregon
District Court had an alternative holding. In Wind River Mining Corp. v. United States, 946 F.2d
710, 715 (9th Cir. 1991), the Ninth Circuit held that the § 2401 statute of limitations did not apply to
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its decision on the text of the ESA itself. It reasoned that because the
ESA included several ongoing Service duties to threatened and
endangered species, like periodic status reviews167 and discretionary
habitat revisions,168 the Service’s duty to designate critical habitat was
also “an ongoing, binding statutory duty.”169 Having found a series of
discrete violations, the court expressly declined to analyze the
continuing-violation doctrine.170
The court also stated that time-barring the Institute’s claim would not
advance the underlying purposes of the federal statute of limitations—
“avoiding stale claims, achieving finality, and protecting those who rely
on the law.”171 The claim was not stale because the Service continued to
study the chub, and had never taken any final action that would indicate
the fish did not need critical habitat.172 A judicial decision would
promote finality, because it would eliminate the uncertainty inherent in
agency inaction.173 The Service’s thirteen years of inaction had not
created a reliance interest in the two parties or the public.174 Finally,
applying a statute of limitations to unreasonable agency delay was
“grossly inappropriate, in that it would mean that [the Service] could
immunize its allegedly unreasonable delay from judicial review simply
by extending that delay for six years.”175
In sum, federal courts have inconsistently applied the statute of
limitations to the Service’s failure to designate critical habitat for
threatened or endangered species. In Hamilton, the Eleventh Circuit
characterized the failure as a one-time, discrete violation that starts the
clock running the first day the Service breaches its duty. Three district
courts disagreed. The Eastern District of Tennessee and the District of
Louisiana called the same failure a single, continuous violation. The
claims alleging that a government agency acted outside its statutory or constitutional authority. The
Oregon court noted that this rule applied to the Service’s failure to list the chub’s critical habitat:
“The Court notes [the Service] does not have the discretion to ignore its statutory duty to designate
critical habitat for the Oregon chub, and, therefore, [the Service’s] 13 years of noncompliance with
the ESA exceeds its statutory authority.” Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, at *6.
167. Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 2007 WL 4117978, at *5 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (2000)).
168. Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(ii) (2000)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at *6.
171. Id. at *5.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Am. Canoe Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 30 F. Supp. 2d 908, 925 (E.D. Va.
1998)) (internal markings omitted).
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District of Oregon held that the Service’s failure to designate critical
habitat is best characterized as a series of discrete violations.
V.

COURTS SHOULD CONSTRUE THE SERVICE’S FAILURE
TO DESIGNATE CRITICAL HABITAT AS A CONTINUING
VIOLATION

The overarching policy purpose of the ESA is the preservation of
threatened and endangered species.176 Courts should construe the
Service’s failure to designate critical habitat as a continuing violation.
First, courts advance this goal by interpreting the Service’s failure to
designate critical habitat for those species as a continuing violation.
Second, the ESA’s text and context are consistent with such an
approach, whereas the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Hamilton is
inconsistent with the plain language and purpose of the ESA. Finally, the
policy purposes underlying the federal statute of limitations do not
justify its application to ESA critical-habitat cases.
A.

Courts Would Advance Congressional Intent by Interpreting the
Service’s Failure to Designate Critical Habitat as a Continuing
Violation

Congress intended to protect the critical habitat of all threatened and
endangered species.177 Courts further that goal when they interpret the
Service’s failure to act as a continuing violation. Such an interpretation
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s application of continuingviolation doctrine. In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation that
the violation was a discrete, one-time event is at odds with congressional
intent.
1.

Both the Continuing-Violation Theory and the Series-ofDiscrete-Violations Theory Further Congressional Intent and
Purpose

If the Service does not designate critical habitat within one year after
issuing a “not determinable” finding, it violates a clear statutory mandate
and undermines the central purpose of the ESA, which is protecting
threatened and endangered species and their habitats.178 The Service’s
176. See supra Part I.
177. See supra Part I.
178. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6).
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failure means that a threatened or endangered species remains without
the full array of protections Congress intended it to have, and the critical
habitat upon which the species depends enjoys no codified protection at
all. Federal agencies can take actions that threaten a species’ habitat so
long as the agencies do not jeopardize the continued existence of the
species itself.179 Because the Service has the duty to protect critical
habitat for every listed species, and because those species remain
without such protection until the Service acts, its failure does not end
until it designates critical habitat.
The plight of the Oregon chub illustrates this danger. When the
Service listed the fish as endangered in 1993, it detailed the dangers
confronting the chub’s habitat, which included chemical spills and
chemical overflow from campground toilets.180 The same problems
confront the chub’s habitat today, and its population continues to
decline.181 The Service’s breach of duty is a continuing violation because
of the ongoing nature of its failure to designate critical habitat.
The situation is analogous to the hostile work environment the
plaintiff endured in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.182
Morgan’s claim arose when the employer’s actions established a hostile
work environment.183 The statute of limitations did not start to run that
day, however, because the hostile work environment continued
throughout the next several years.184 Yet the Court held that only if
Amtrak had eliminated the racial hostility in Morgan’s workplace would
the statute of limitations have started to run.185 For the chub, the reality
of living without a critical-habitat designation arose on the day after the
Service’s deadline to designate critical habitat passed. The statute of
179. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
180. See Determination of Endangered Status for the Oregon Chub, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,800 (Oct. 18,
1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (“These populations are threatened by . . . direct mortality
from chemical spills from overturned truck or rail tankers, runoff or accidental spill of brush control
and agricultural chemicals, and overflow from chemical toilets in campgrounds.”).
181. See
NatureServe
Explorer:
Oregonichthys
crameri,
http://www.natureserve.org/explorer/servlet/NatureServe?searchName=Oregonichthys+crameri.,
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev403n181a.pdf;
United
States
Fish
&
Wildlife
Service,
Oregon
Chub
Fact
Sheet,
http://www.fws.gov/oregonfwo/Species/Data/OregonChub, permanent copy available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev403n181b.pdf.
182. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
183. See id. at 115–16. The Court noted, however, that it might not be possible to identify the
exact day on which the claim arose, as a hostile work environment might not be established by a
single act. Id.
184. See id. at 115.
185. See id. at 118.
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limitations did not start to run at that time, though, because the lack of
critical-habitat designation continued. Just as the workplace racial
hostility in Morgan was determined by the court to be a single,
continuing violation that spanned across years, so too was the absence of
critical-habitat protection with which the chub lived. Because the statute
of limitations did not start to run, the Institute for Wildlife Protection
was able to file a citizen suit and secure critical-habitat protections for
the chub.186 Such a result is consistent with Congress’ intent that the
Service protect the critical habitat of all threatened or endangered
species, unless doing so would not be in the best interests of the species.
2. Courts Should Adopt the Continuing-Violation Theory
The continuing-violation theory is more consistent with the nature of
the Service’s violation than the series-of-discrete-violations theory. The
series-of-discrete violations approach, as illustrated by the Oregon
District Court decision in Institute for Wildlife Protection, yields an
outcome that is consistent with congressional intent, but inaccurately
describes the problem. In the context of the Oregon chub, the series-ofdiscrete violations approach implies that the Service affirmatively
breaches its duty on repeated occasions. This is an accurate description
of the case cited by the court—Knight v. Columbus187—but not of the
Service’s inaction. In Knight, the City took the affirmative step of
issuing faulty paychecks before and during the filing period. Each
paycheck represented a discrete violation of the relevant law, and the
firefighters could recover for only those breaches that occurred within
the filing window.188 The series-of-discrete-violations theory did not
accurately describe Service inaction, however. In contrast to Knight, the
problem presented to the Oregon court was not that the Service breached
its duty again and again, but that it never stopped violating the law in the
first place.
Because the Service consistently violates its mandatory obligations
when it fails to designate critical habitat, courts should characterize the
failure as a continuing violation. As the Western District of Louisiana
concluded in Schoeffler v. Kempthorne,189 the Service’s duty to
designate critical habitat continues until the final regulation is published.
186. Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., No. 3:07CV00358, 2007 WL 4117978,
at *5–6 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007).
187. 19 F.3d 579 (11th Cir. 1994).
188. Id. at 582.
189. 493 F. Supp. 2d 805 (W.D. La. 2007).
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Thus, like the situation in Morgan, the violation begins outside of the
limitations period and runs until the agency takes action to cure the
violation. As such, the continuing-violation theory is more consistent
with the nature of the Service’s failure to designate critical habitat than
the series-of-discrete-violations theory.
The result in Center for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton,190 on the
other hand, is fundamentally at odds with congressional intent behind
mandating the designation of critical habitat. The Service listed the
Goldline Darter and Blue Shiner minnows as threatened in 1992, and
listed the dangers to their survival.191 The problems included
urbanization, water degradation, and pollution.192 The minnows suffer
from the same dangers today.193 During the first six years the minnows
struggled without critical habitat, a person could bring a citizen suit to
force the Service to give the fish the protection Congress wanted them to
have. Today, because of the Hamilton decision, there is no legal
mechanism to force the Service to designate the minnows’ critical
habitat.194 This is the case even though the reality faced by the minnows
has not changed at all—extinction is just as likely today as it was in
1992. As a result of the approach adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, the
Service managed to avoid its legal duty by delaying action for more than
six years. This result contradicts Congress’ purpose in enacting the ESA.
B.

The Plain Text and Context of the ESA Show That Congress Did
Not Intend the Statute of Limitations to Time-Bar Citizen Suits

Statutory interpretation starts with the language of the statute itself.195
Courts look to the entire law and its object and policy when deciding the
meaning of any particular provision, and should not let a single sentence

190. 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006).
191. See Determination of Endangered Status for the Oregon Chub, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,800, 53,800–
01 (Oct. 18, 1993) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
192. Id.
193. See United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Environmental Conservation Online System:
Goldline Darter, http://ecos.fws.gov/docs/life_histories/E05S.html (last visited June 1, 2008),
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83wlr403n193.pdf.
194. See S. Appalachian v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 181 F. Supp. 2d 883, 887 (E.D. Tenn.
2001) (“If the Service’s failure to designate critical habitat is time-barred then no one may compel
the Service to do so.”) (emphasis in original).
195. Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (quoting Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
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control interpretation.196 Additionally, courts also avoid interpretations
that would render a part of the statute superfluous.197
1. Courts Would Undermine One of the ESA’s Chief Enforcement
Provisions If They Were to Time-Bar Citizen Suits
The overarching policy purpose of the ESA is the protection of
threatened and endangered species and the habitats on which they
depend.198 Congress made it clear that the Service’s duty to designate
critical habitat for threatened and endangered species is mandatory. The
ESA provides that the Service “shall” designate critical habitat for
threatened and endangered species concurrently with listing them.199 The
statute makes it just as clear that a “not determinable” finding does not
transform that mandatory duty into a discretionary one. The ESA states
that the Service is allowed one additional year to study a particular
species and its environment, after which time it “must” designate critical
habitat.200 Congress chose words that clearly create a mandatory duty.201
An interpretation of the ESA that time-bars citizen suits repeals that
mandatory duty whenever six years have passed. The ESA’s citizen-suit
provision is the only legal mechanism to force the Service to perform its
obligation to designate critical habitat.202 Citizen suits have become
increasingly important because private litigation is the driving force
behind most critical-habitat designations today.203 The citizen-suit
provision would lose much of its force if courts time-bar claims brought
more than six years after the Service first fails to list a species’ critical
habitat. For example, the Eleventh Circuit’s Hamilton decision means
196. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 350 U.S. 270, 285 (1956) (quoting Heirs
of Boisdoré, 49 U.S. 113, 121 (1850)).
197. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell,
107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883)) (“It is [a court’s] duty to ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and
word of a statute,’ rather than to emasculate an entire section.”).
198. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
199. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i).
200. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii).
201. In contrast, Congress used “may” in other places in the ESA to indicate a discretionary duty.
See, e.g., § 1533(a)(3)(A)(ii) (“may, from time-to-time thereafter as appropriate, revise such [critical
habitat] designation [after making the initial designation]”). See 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 57.3 (6th ed. 2001) (“The form of the verb used in a statute, i.e.,
something ‘may,’ ‘shall’ or ‘must’ be done, is the single most important textual consideration
determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory.”).
202. See supra note 194.
203. Id. at 886 (“[T]he designation of critical habitat is now driven almost exclusively by
litigation.”).
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that the Goldline Darter and Blue Shiner will be without designated
critical habitats until the Service decides to act.204 Without an effective
mechanism to force the Service to designate critical habitat, many of the
ESA’s other protections would be undermined. The ESA requires that
federal agencies consult with the Service to ensure their actions do not
result in the “destruction or adverse modification” of threatened or
endangered species’ critical habitats.205 If no one can force the Service to
designate critical habitat for threatened and endangered species, federal
agencies will not have to consult with the Service about actions that
might affect the species’ habitats.206
2. The Eleventh Circuit’s Textual Analysis in Hamilton is Flawed
In contrast to interpretations that do not time-bar citizen suits, the
Eleventh Circuit’s textual interpretation of the ESA is awkward and
strained. First, the court failed to ask the relevant question throughout its
analysis. Because the court focused solely on when the Service’s failure
arose, it did not engage the argument that the failure is a continuing
violation that would toll the statute of limitations until the failure is
cured. Second, the court’s proffered interpretation creates unnecessary
inconsistency within the ESA itself.
The court based its analysis on the clauses “not later than” and “based
on such data as may be available at that time.”207 The court argued that
“not later than” creates a fixed point in time at which the violation
arises.208 It found additional textual support in the language “such data
as may be available at the time,”209 arguing that the clause would require
the Service to ignore current data when promulgating a rule if the
Service’s duty was in fact ongoing.210
The court was correct to note that a violation “arises” on a single day.
That, however, was not the relevant issue. The court should have
focused its attention on when the violation ended, not on when it began,
204. See supra note 194.
205. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
206. Agencies would still have to consult with the Service about actions “likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species . . . .” Id. § 1536(a)(2).
207. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F.3d 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting
16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000)).
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000)). As discussed supra note 123, the court
misquoted the ESA during its textual analysis; the Act actually reads, “at that time.” 16 U.S.C. §
1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000) (emphasis added).
210. Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000)).
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as the Supreme Court did in National Railroad Passenger Corp. v.
Morgan.211 In Morgan, the Court considered when a hostile work
environment “occurs.” The Court held that a hostile environment first
arises at a particular moment, but can then continue for years
afterward.212 The statute of limitations on a hostile-work-environment
claim starts to run only when the employer eliminates workplace
hostility—that is, when the violation ends.213 The Eleventh Circuit’s
textual analysis ignored the critical question: When did the Service’s
duty to list critical habitat for the Goldline Darter and Blue Shiner end?
The Eleventh Circuit’s other basis of textual support is weak as well.
The court concluded that the language “such data as may be available at
the [sic] time”214 meant the Service would have to rely on 1993 data
when determining the minnows’ critical habitats in 2006. This analysis
emerged at the district-court level: “It would be difficult now, after
twelve years of changing conditions, to determine a critical habitat
‘based on such data as may [have been] available . . . [in 1993].’ Indeed,
the area that may have been critical habitat in 1993 quite probably would
have changed by [now].”215 As noted by the Eleventh Circuit, such a
result would be “anomalous.”216
A much more plausible interpretation of the statute is that “based on
such data as may be available at that time” refers to the moment the
Service “publish[es] a final regulation.”217 This reading requires the
Service to base its critical-habitat designations on the data available at
the time it studies a species’ habitat with the goal of making a final
critical-habitat designation, which is consistent with the goal of
protecting threatened and endangered species. This interpretation is also
consistent with other subsections of the ESA, one of which requires that
the Service “designate critical habitat . . . on the basis of the best
scientific data available . . . .”218 Because the Service has the authority to
revise a “not determinable” designation,219 and because the ESA requires

211. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
212. See id. at 115–21.
213. See id. at 118.
214. Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000)). See supra note
123.
215. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2005),
aff’d, 453 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000)).
216. Hamilton, 453 F.3d at 1335.
217. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii) (2000).
218. Id. § 1533(b)(2).
219. See id. § 1532(5)(B) (“Critical habitat may be established for those species now listed as
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that it use the best data available to do so, the Eleventh Circuit’s
interpretation that the Service would have to use only old data is
inconsistent with another part of the Act.
Finally, even the Service itself seems to recognize the fallacy of the
Hamilton court’s textual analysis. For instance, after losing in Schoeffler,
the Service argued against a proposed thirty-day deadline for listing the
black bear’s critical habitat by saying it would need more time to gather
the new information necessary: “The Service’s present best estimate is
that significant changes in the landscape and habitat threats . . . will have
rendered both the [1993] proposed critical habitat designation and the
draft 1994 economic analysis obsolete.”220 In May 2008, the Service
proposed the black bear’s critical habitat.221 The Service plans to
consider data that was not available in 1993, when its duty to list habitat
for the bear first arose.222 The Service invited public comment on,
among other things, “current or planned activities” that might impact
proposed habitat.223
C.

Courts Do Not Further the Purposes of the Federal Statute of
Limitations by Time-Barring Citizen Suits Brought to Force
Designation of Critical Habitat

The policy purposes of the general federal statute of limitations do not
justify applying the statute to citizen suits against the Service. First,
citizen suits are not unfair to the Service, because they do not create the
danger of lost evidence or faded memories. Also, citizen suits promote
social stability by bringing finality to uncertain situations. These cases
are not likely to lack merit. Finally, Congress intended a broad waiver of
the federal government’s sovereign immunity when it passed the ESA’s
citizen-suit provision.
Courts do not further the purposes of the general federal statute of
limitations by time-barring citizen suits to force the Service to designate
critical habitat for threatened or endangered species. As a result of the
threatened or endangered species for which no critical habitat has heretofore been
established . . . .”).
220. Schoeffler v. Kempthorne, 493 F. Supp. 2d 805, 822 (W.D. La. 2007) (quoting Defendant’s
Brief Opposing Summary Judgment at 10 (No. 6:05CV01573), available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/notes/83washlrev403n220.pdf).
221. See Proposed Rule, Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Designation of Critical
Habitat for the Louisiana Black Bear (Ursus americanus luteolus), 73 Fed. Reg. 25,354 (May 6,
2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
222. See id. (describing data in the “background” section).
223. Id.
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regular publication of listings and notices in the Federal Register on
endangered and threatened species, there is no real danger of lost
evidence, faded memories, or witnesses who have disappeared. A court
would therefore have the entire record of the Service’s action and
inaction before it when making a decision.224 Moreover, the
determination is usually a purely legal determination, as the facts are not
in dispute—the Service has either listed critical habitat for the threatened
or endangered species or it has not.225 In fact, the Service has on at least
one occasion admitted its failure to comply with the Act.226
Additionally, a decision on the merits promotes the principle of
finality more effectively than does a time-bar. The Service’s inaction
creates particular uncertainty because it is not final. If mandatory
deadlines given by the ESA are not adhered to, interested parties are left
waiting until the Service decides to take action. Citizen groups are
therefore motivated to relentlessly petition the Service to designate
habitat, attempting to force it to carry out its duty to consider the petition
and take appropriate action.227 Unless the species recovers without
critical-habitat protection, extinction is the only event that could bring
finality to this continuing exchange. In contrast, a ruling on the merits
would bring resolution to groups’ efforts, and it would end the
uncertainty about the scope of the protections the Service must extend to
a particular species.
Finally, courts act consistently with congressional intent regarding the
scope of the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity when they toll
the statute of limitations and order the Service to designate critical
habitat. Although waivers are generally construed narrowly, Congress’s
decision to include a citizen-suit provision in a statute represents a
legislative judgment that the government should not be immune from
suit in the context of that statute. Congress included the citizen-suit
provision in the ESA so that private groups can enforce the Service’s
mandatory duties, including its obligation to designate critical habitat.228
224. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A) (2000) (“The [Service] shall promptly publish each
finding made under this subparagraph in the Federal Register.”).
225. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Hamilton, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1335 (N.D. Ga.
2005) (“The statute of limitations issue here is a pure question of law . . . .”).
226. See, e.g., Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1268 (11th Cir.
2007) (“We are troubled by the Service’s apparent practice of routinely delaying critical habitat
designation until forced to act by court order.”); Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., No. 3:07CV00358, 2007 WL 4117978, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 16, 2007) (“[The Service] admits
its failure to comply with the statute.”).
227. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.14(d) (2007).
228. See Alabama-Tombigee Rivers Coal, 477 F.3d at 1269 (explaining how the history of the
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The scope of the waiver is coterminous with the Service’s mandatory
duties. When courts allow citizen suits to proceed, they facilitate the
very goal Congress had in mind when it waived the government’s
sovereign immunity—vigorous private enforcement of the ESA.
CONCLUSION
Courts should treat the Service’s failure to designate critical habitat
for threatened and endangered species as a continuing violation that tolls
the statute of limitations. Such an approach is consistent with the
overarching policy purpose of the ESA—protecting threatened and
endangered species and their habitats. Construing the failure to designate
critical habitat as a continuing violation is consistent with the plain
language of the ESA, in that it empowers citizens to force the Service to
comply with its mandatory duties. It also prevents the Service from
escaping its responsibilities through delay. Finally, Congress intended
that very result when it waived the government’s sovereign immunity by
including a citizen-suit provision in the ESA.
Courts should reject the Eleventh Circuit’s approach in the Hamilton
decision. The court’s reasoning is strained because it relies on a
counterintuitive reading of the statute’s plain text and creates
inconsistencies between provisions within the ESA. Congress intended
for the designation of critical habitat to be a mandatory duty that the
Secretary could not escape by raising the statute of limitations as a
defense. Unless courts construe the Service’s failure to perform its
mandatory duty as a continuing violation, they will frustrate
congressional intent. Species that are already endangered might face
extinction, and no one could compel the Secretary to designate critical
habitat. Characterizing the failure to designate critical habitat as a
continuing violation furthers the purpose of the ESA, and guarantees a
stronger enforcement mechanism for agency compliance.

ESA shows that Congress intended for critical habitats to be designated even if delayed, and noting
that “Congress intended to protect endangered species, not to strip them of protection in order to
motivate an administrative agency to protect them.”).
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